Double-principal Agent: False Accounting Information, Supervision Cost and Corporate Performance

Journal of Systems Science and Information ›› 2014, Vol. 2 ›› Issue (4) : 301-312.

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Journal of Systems Science and Information ›› 2014, Vol. 2 ›› Issue (4) : 301-312.

Double-principal Agent: False Accounting Information, Supervision Cost and Corporate Performance

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}. J Sys Sci Info, 2014, 2(4): 301-312

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